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In the United States the percentage of individuals sixty-five years
of age or older is growing at a remarkably rapid rate. In 1970, about
ten percent of the population occupied this age bracket. By the year
2000, this figure is projected to rise to twelve percent.1 If present demo-
graphic trends continue, by the year 2030 the sixty-five and over age
group will number more than fifty-one million people-roughly seven-
teen percent of the population.2 This apparently unavoidable aging of
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THE FOLLOWING CITATIONS WILL BE USED IN THIS ARTICLE:
S. 209 (The ERISA Improvements Act of 1979), 96th Cong., Ist Sess., 125 CONG. REc. S560
(daily ed. Jan. 24, 1979) [hereinafter cited as S. 209];
S. 3140 (The Simplified Pension Plan Act), reprinted in Hearings on S. 3140 Before the Sub-
comm. on Private Pension Plans and Employee Benefits of the Senate Finance Comm., 95th Cong.,
2d Sess. 3 (1978) [hereinafter cited as S. 3140];
S. 3017 (The ERISA Improvements Act of 1978), reprinted in Hearings on S, 3017, at 3
[hereinafter cited as S. 3017];
H.R. 13576, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REc. 117237 (daily ed. July 24, 1978) [hereinaf-
ter cited as H.R. 13576];
Joint Hearings on S. 3017 Before the Subcoma on Labor of the Senate Comm on Human
Resources and the Subcomm. on Private Pension Plans and Employee Fringe Benefts of the Senate
Comm. on Finance, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on S. 3014];
Report of the Comm on Finance of the Senate on H.R. 13511, S. RP. No. 1263, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1978), reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 6761 [hereinafter cited as 1978
SENATE REPORT];
H. SHEPPARD & S. Rix, THE GRAYING OF WORKING AMERICA (1977) [hereinafter cited as
SHEPPARD & RIx];
Califano, Joseph A., Jr. Remarks before the American Academy of Political and Social Sci-
ence (April 8, 1978) [hereinafter cited as Califano Remarks].
I. SHEPPARD & RIX 1-2; see U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CuR-
RENT POPULATION REPORTS, series P-25, Nos. 310, 311, 519, 643 and 704. The median age of the
population in 1970 was 28. It is expected to reach 30 by 1980 and 35 by 2000. Americans Change,
Bus. WEEK, Feb. 20, 1978, at 64.
2. SHEPPARD & Rix 1. The aging trend of the population is attributable to a number of
important factors. First, life expectancy in the United States has increased from an average of
63 years in 1940 to 69 for men and 77 for women. Califano Remarks 3. Three quarters of the
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the population raises serious policy questions of how best to cope with
the change.
Numerous concerns have been raised regarding the provision of
adequate retirement income for the growing number of older people.3
The need to provide retirement income for an older population has
population attain the age of 65. Id Once there, they will, on the average, live to the age of 81.
Second, the fertility rate (number of children born to the average female) is decreasing. Americans
Change, Bus. WEEK, Feb. 20, 1978, at 65. From 3.8 in the mid-1950s, the fertility rate declined to
1.76 in 1976. Id While some experts contend that this rate will continue to fall, the Census
Bureau predicts that the figure will eventually move up to 2.1, the replacement level leading to a
stable population. Id 66. According to Professor Robert L. Clark, the social and economic trends
affecting the fertility rate include failing marriage and rising divorce rates, deferred childbearing,
the upswing in single-parenthood, two wage-earner and individual households, and higher educa-
tional levels. Other factors include the increased work experience and career opportunities for
young women, the high cost of rearing and educating children, and the increasing use of birth
control. Id Finally, the post-war "baby boom" between 1946 and 1960 will become the "senior
boom" in the next century, increasing the age of the population as a whole. Califano Remarks 3.
See generally SHEPPARD & Rix.
3. See 123 CONG. REc. S16057 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1977); 124 CONG. REc. S6584, S6586
(daily ed. May 1, 1978); 124 CONG. REc. S15500, S15501 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1978) (statements of
Senator Javits); Hearings Before the Senate Governmental4ffairs Comm. on Reorganization Plan
No. 4 of 1978, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1978) (statement of Senator Javits). See also 124 CONG.
REc. 56581 (daily ed. May 1, 1978) (statement of Senator Williams); Remarks of Senator Wil-
liams, International Foundation of Employee Benefit Plans (May 23, 1978); Remarks of Senator
Williams, Employee Benefit Trusts Workshop, Trust Division of the American Bankers Associa-
tion (Sept. 15, 1978); Remarks of Senator Williams, American Council of Life Insurance (Nov. 2,
1977).
In this vein, numerous questions have been raised, including the following: Will it be neces-
sary or feasible to raise Social Security taxes substantially as the ratio of active workers to retired
citizens changes from six to one today to three to one in 2030? Califano Remarks 4. Will it be
necessary to raise the age for normal Social Security benefits from 65 to 68 years in an effort to
slow down the present trend toward early retirement which has the tendency of increasing the
costs of the Social Security system as well as public and private pension plans? This latter propo-
sal was advanced as part of the Minority House Ways and Means Committee program for financ-
ing the Social Security system. See 123 CONG. REC. E5454 (daily ed. Sept. 9, 1977); Secretary of
Commerce Kreps also suggested the possibility of raising the normal retirement age for Social
Security benefits. See Statement on Worklife Extension by Juanita M. Kreps, Secretary of Com-
merce, in Washington, D.C. (Aug. 5, 1977). With regard to early retirement, Secretary Califano
has noted that
[In 1948] nearly one-half of all men 65 years and over remained in the workforce. Today,
among people 65 and over, only one man in five and one woman in twelve, are in the
workforce. . . . [I]n 1963, only 23 percent of workers 45-54 indicated they intended to
retire early; by 1976, this had risen to 41 percent.
Califano Remarks 4. (
During the period 1955 to 1977, "the participation rate of 65-69 year olds has declined at a
rate of nearly 40 percent. Among males, the ratio of years of work to years of retirement has
declined from 14:1 to about 5:1 during this century." SHEPPARD & Rix 4. See generally Hearings
on . 1784 Before the Subcomm on Labor of the Senate Comm on Human Resources, 95th Cong.,
Ist Sess. (1977); Hearings on H.R. 65 andH.A 1115 Before the Subcomm. on Employment Opportu-
nities of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); *hen Retirement
Doesn't Happen, Bus. WEEK, June 19, 1978 at 72; Special Reports: Early Retirement, Employee
Benefit Plan Review, Sept. 1978, at 16; see also SHEPPARD & Rix 8-12, 104-15.
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stimulated discussion of the respective roles of Social Security and pri-
vate retirement programs. In light of the apparent inability of private
retirement plans to keep pace with inflation,5 the inadequate funding of
some retirement programs 6 and the uneven distribution of private pen-
sion benefits,' some observers have questioned whether it might make
better sense to curtail tax incentives that encourage private plans and
apply the resulting revenue gains to more generous and widespread So-
cial Security coverage.' Other observers have questioned the continu-
ing financial solvency of Social Security, which is not advance-funded,
and have advocated the expansion of private retirement plan coverage
and benefits in light of the important role private plans play in supple-
menting Social Security benefits and in providing large pools of capital
that can stimulate economic growth.9
There is no one solution to the problem of providing adequate re-
tirement income for older Americans. One approach, which involves
4. Compare 12 CONG. REC. S15500-01 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1978) (statement of Senator Ja-
vits) and Hearings Before the Senate Go vernmentalAffairs Comm. on Reorganization Plan No. 4 of
1978, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1978) (statement of Senator Javits) with Califano Remarks. See
generally N. TuR, THE FUTURE OF PRIVATE PENSION PLANS (1976).
5. See Califano Remarks 17-18; see generally R. SCHMIDT, MAJOR ISSUES FACING THE PRI-
VATE PENSION SYSTEM 25-26 (Education and Public Welfare Division, Congressional Research
Service, Library of Congress, Jan. 27, 1978); SHEPPARD & Rix 132-33.
6. The size of unfunded pension liabilities has received considerable attention. See, eg.,
Hearings on S 2992 Before the Subcomm. on Private Pension Plans and Employee Fringe Ben§ts of
the Senate Comm. on Finance, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978); Remarks of I. Lanoff, ERISA Work-
shop Group, Cornell University (May 22, 1978); Pensions-A $100-Billion Misunderstanding, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 4, 1978, at A-18, col. 1; Remarks of I. Lanoff, the Institutional Investor Conference
(Jan. 13, 1978); Letter from Senator Javits, N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 1978, at 18, col. 1; A.F. Ehrbar,
Those Pension Plans Are Even Weaker Than You Think, FORTUNE, Nov., 1977, at 104; Unfunded
Pension Liabilities, Bus. WEEK, July 18, 1977, at 86; Rankin, Worrying About the Pension Gap,
The New York Times National Economic Survey 64 (Jan. 8, 1978). See generallyJ. TREYNOR, P.
REGAN & W. PRIEST, FINANCIAL REALITY OF PENSION FUNDING UNDER ERISA (1976).
7. Califano Remarks 18.
8. Revenue losses arise from a number of special tax incentives including: an employer
deduction for contributions to a qualified plan; a tax exemption for the income earned by a trust
that forms part of a qualified plan; the forbearance from taxing employees on benefits under the
plan until benefits are distributed; the special treatment of lump sum distributions from qualified
plans through tax-free rollovers and 10-year forward income averaging; and certain estate and gift
tax exclusions. See Califano Remarks 18. See generally M. BERNSTEIN, THE FUTURE OF PRIVATE
PENSIONS (1964).
9. 124 CONG. REC. S15500 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1978) (statement of Senator Javits).
Based on Securities and Exchange Commission and Federal Reserve Flow of Funds Ac-
counts year-end 1976 figures, it is estimated that the book value of private noninsured pension
assets for spring 1978 total $182 billion and that private insured pension assets total $91 billion. J.
RIUKIN & R. BARBER, THE NORTH WILL RISE AGAIN 235 (1978). Currently, 20 to 25% of the
equity in American corporations and 40% of the bonds are held by pension funds, including pri-
vate, state and federal plans. Id 10. It is said that "Pension funds are now the largest source of
investment capital for the American capitalist system." Id
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expanding the role that private retirement plans' ° play, is embodied in
numerous proposals to amend the Employee Retirement Income Se-
curity Act of 1974 (ERISA)'1 and the Internal Revenue Code (IRC)
that were before the Ninety-fifth Congress and are presently before the
Ninety-sixth Congress. This Article will focus on these proposals to
expand the coverage and benefits of private retirement plans, briefly
describing each proposal and discussing its relative merits.
I. PROPOSALS FOR EXPANSION OF PRIVATE RETIREMENT PLAN
COVERAGE
A government study indicates that in 1975 only 46.2% of all pri-
vate industry wage and salary workers were covered by retirement
plans.' 2 This percentage represents 30.3 million wage and salary em-
ployees. 13 Although these figures compare favorably to those of earlier
years,14 even more workers must be covered by plans if minimal retire-
ment benefits are to be provided to a broad cross-section of a progres-
sively aging population.' 5
During the Ninety-fifth Congress,16 three important ideas were ad-
vanced for increasing retirement plan coverage. Two were set forth in
S. 3017,17 which would permit financial institutions', to establish spe-
cial master plans 19 and would grant tax credits to small employers who
establish new plans.2 0 The third idea was contained in S. 3140, which
would permit employers to contribute up to the annual $7,500 Keogh
plan limitation to a separate individual retirement account (IRA) for
10. The term "private retirement plans" includes: ERISA-covered employee pension benefit
plans as defined by Section 3(2) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ER-
ISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2) (1976); and non-ERISA Title I trusts such as Individual Retirement
Accounts under section 408 of the Internal Revenue Code.
11. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1381 (1976).
12. U.S. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WEL-
FARE, SOCIAL SECURITY BULL. No. (SSA) 78-11700, at 21-22 (Nov. 1977).
13. Id 19, 21.
14. For example, in 1950 only 9.8 million wage and salary employees were covered by retire-
ment plans, comprising 22.5% of that class of workers. In 1960, 18.7 million wage and salary
employees, that is approximately 37.2% of such workers, were covered by retirement plans. Id 20,
22.
15. See statements of Senators Javits and Williams, supra note 3.
16. Most of the proposals which were not approved by the Ninety-fifth Congress have been
reintroduced in the Ninety-sixth Congress. Where appropriate, reference to the new bill(s) will be
made.
17. The introductory statements accompanying S. 3017 appear at 124 CONG. REC. S6584
(daily ed. May 1, 1978).
18. The term financial institution includes banks, insurance companies and mutual funds.
19. S. 3017 § 401(a).
20. Id § 304.
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each employee. 21 A variant of this concept was included in the Reve-
nue Act of 1978, which was signed into law on November 6 of that
year.2 2 All three proposals are principally intended to encourage small
employers to establish retirement plans- 3
A. Special Master Plan (SMP).
S. 3017's SMP proposal builds upon existing rules permitting the
sponsorship of master and prototype plans.24 As envisioned by the bill,
an SMP is a master or prototype individual account employee benefit
21. S. 3140 § 3.
22. Pub. L. No. 95-600, 92 Stat. 2763. See H.R. REP. No. 1445, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978),
reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 7046; 1978 SENATE REPORT, H.R. REP. No.
1800, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) (Conference Report), reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 7198.
23. It is thought that small employers have the most difficult time complying with ERISA,
see Hearings on S. 3017 at 490 (statement of James D. McKevitt). It is also thought that the
greatest growth in new retirement plan coverage may be achieved in the small business sector, see
Hearings on S. 3017 at 296 (statement of Daniel I. Halperin). The principal purpose of the pro-
posals discussed in this section-the special master plan, simplified employee pension, and the
new plan tax credit-is to encourage employers who do not sponsor plans to establish new plans.
Bills like S. 3017 and S. 209 also contain provisions that are intended not only to encourage
the sponsorship of new plans by removing deterrents to plan establishment, but also to encourage
the continued maintenance of existing plans. To encourage plan maintenance and plan forma-
tion, S. 3017 contains the following sections: reduction of paperwork (sections 221-228); facilita-
tion of compliance with ERISA's minimum standards provisions (sections 231-236, 239, 251) and
facilitation of compliance with ERISA's fiduciary responsibility provisions (sections 261-265).
Similar provisions are contained in S. 3017's successor bill, S. 209.
In light of the Supreme Court's reversal of the Seventh Circuit's decision in International
Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 99 S. Ct. 790 (1979), S. 209 would provide prospectively that state
securities laws and the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws do not apply to ERISA-
covered plans within as well as not within the scope of the Supreme Court's holding. (The deci-
sion c6vered only noncontributory, compulsory pension plans.) The bill would not affect any se-
curities law rights that participants in non-Daniel type plans may have had prior to the bill's
enactment. In addition, S. 209 would prospectively make it unlawful for any person knowingly to
misrepresent the terms and conditions of an employee benefit plan, the financial condition of a
plan or the status under the plan of any employee, participant or beneficiary. An injured party
would be permitted to bring a civil action for damages due to reliance on such misrepresentation.
No plan would be liable for such damages, and no person would be liable with respect to a plan
document required under ERISA or the IRC to the extent such document satisfies the require-
ments of these statutes. S. 209, §§ 153, 154.
24. Certain existing rules relating to master and prototype plans are contained in the follow-
ing: Rev. Rul. 71-479, 1971-2 C.B. 238; Rev. Rul. 71-461, 1971-2 C.B. 227; Rev. Rul. 71-25, 1971-
1 C.B. 115; Rev. Rul. 70-28, 1970-1 C.B. 86; Rev. Proc. 75-52, 1975 C.B. 49; Rev. Proc. 72-8, 1972-
1 C.B. 716.
The principal difference between a SMP and existing master or prototype plans is that, under
the SMP, more legal responsibilities are assumed by the sponsoring financial institution. Under
the SMP, for example, the financial institution would be legally responsible as administrator for
preparing and filing the annual report (Form 5500 series) required under section 103 of ERISA.
The financial institution would also have the legal duty of preparing the summary plan descrip-
tion required under section 102(a)(1) of ERISA. In addition, the financial institution would apply
for a SMP certificate indicating the tax-qualified status of the SMP under I.RC. § 401.
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plan,25 all the assets of which are controlled by one or more investment
managers. 26 The investment manager sponsoring the SMP is the
master sponsor,27 and the employer participating in the SMP is the em-
ployer sponsor.28 The duties of the employer sponsor under Title I of
ERISA are limited to making timely contributions and to furnishing
such timely, complete and accurate information as may be required by
the SMP.29 Under the plan qualification provisions of the IRC, these
duties are deemed initially satisfied as of the date on which the SMP
joinder is executed between the employer sponsor and the master spon-
sor.30 Should the employer sponsor fail to make timely payments or to
furnish required information, the bill would require him to assume cer-
tain duties previously performed by the master sponsor.31
In addition to the duties associated with managing the plan's as-
sets, the master sponsor also serves as the administrator and the named
fiduciary of each employer sponsor's plan.32 The master sponsor, how-
ever, does not have fiduciary or cofiduciary responsibility under sec-
tions 404 and 405 of ERISA to ascertain whether the information
required to be furnished by the employer sponsor under the SMP is
accurate or complete.33 Similarly, the master sponsor has no fiduciary
or cofiduciary responsibility upon failure of the employer sponsor to
make timely contributions or furnish required information.34 In order
to facilitate the efficient operation of Special Master Plans, certain re-
porting and disclosure requirements are simplified,35 and certain fiduci-
25. Section 3 of ERISA defines an employee benefit plan as an "employee welfare benefit
plan [29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1976)] or an employee pension benefit plan [29 U.S.C. § 1002(2) (1976)]
or a plan which is both an employee welfare benefit plan and an employee pension benefit plan."
29 U.S.C. § 1002(3) (1976).
26. S. 3017 § 401(a) (adding new § 601(a)(2) of ERISA).
27. S. 3017 § 401(a) (adding new § 601(a)(3) of ERISA).
28. S. 3017 § 401(a) (adding new § 601(a)(4) of ERISA).
29. S. 3017 § 401(a) (adding new § 601(b)(1) of ERISA).
30. S. 3017 § 401(a) (adding new § 601(b)(2) of ERISA).
31. S. 3017 § 401(a) (adding new § 601(e) of ERISA). The employer sponsor's failure to meet
his obligations will result in his being deemed the plan administrator. The master sponsor will
cease to be the administrator and the named fiduciary of the employer sponsor's plan.
32. S, 3017 § 401(a) (adding new § 601(c)(1) of ERISA).
33. S. 3017 § 401(a) (adding new § 601(c)(5)(A) of ERISA).
Section 404 of ERISA imposes on fiduciaries such duties as the "prudent man" rule, the
"solely in the interest of the participant" rule, the "exclusive purpose" rule, and the asset diversifi-
cation requirement. Section 405 of ERISA imposes liability on fiduciaries for breach of duty by
another under certain circumstances.
34. S. 3017 § 601(a) (adding new § 601(c)(5)(B) of ERISA).
35. S. 3017 § 601(a) (adding new § 601(c)(2)(3) of ERISA). Under these provisions, the
master sponsor may prepare plan descriptions and summary plan descriptions containing provi-
sions common to the plans supplemented by a description of each variation from the common
provisions. In addition, the master sponsor may also prepare an annual report reflecting the aggre-
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ary requirements are clarified.36
An SMP will be approved by the administering agency 7 only
upon determination that the plan of the employer sponsor, in both de-
sign and operation,3 8 satisfies ERISA criteria as well as section 401 of
the IRC.39 Upon the plan's approval, an SMP certificate will be issued
to the master sponsor. For five years from the date of an employer
sponsor's adoption of the SMP a duly notorized copy of this SMP cer-
tificate will be prima facie evidence that the plan meets certain ERISA
and IRC standards.'
From a tax viewpoint, the major difference between the SMP pro-
posal and existing Internal Revenue Service (IRS) procedures for cor-
porate master plans is that the SMP employer sponsor would have no
need to apply for an IRS determination on the qualification of his
plan.4' This elimination of the need to apply for a determination letter
constitutes a key reduction of responsibilities for employers. Requir-
ing, as has been suggested, all employer sponsors to "pay" for this re-
duction of duties through the imposition of faster participation and
vesting standards would be a blunderbuss approach that may deter
gate assets of the master plan if the report also identifies, among other things, each employer
sponsor and indicates the percentage of total assets attributable to each employer sponsor.
36. S. 3017 § 401(a) (adding new § 601(c)(4) of ERISA). Under this section the statutory
prohibited transactions exemption, contained in section 408(b)(2) of ERISA (relating to making
arrangements with a party in interest for office space, or legal, accounting or other services for
reasonable compensation), "shall be applied as if any investment manager sponsoring a SMP and
any investment manager providing services to such a plan were a party in interest respecting such
plan for a reason other than by virtue of such investment manager's being a fiduciary." Id This
section also provides that the term "bank or similar financial institution" in section 408(b)(6) of
ERISA, containing the ancillary services prohibited transaction exemption, means "any invest-
ment manager who is a master sponsor." 1d The term "sound banking and financial practice" in
section 406(b)(6) of ERISA means "sound fiduciary practice" in the case of an investment man-
ager other than a bank. Id
37. Title I of S. 3017 would establish a single, independent agency, the Employee Benefits
Commission. This new agency would be the administering agency for the SMP.
38. Certain commentators have criticized this standard because they doubt that the adminis-
tering agency can determine that the employer sponsor's plan is nondiscriminatory "in operation"
before the plan has been adopted and implemented. Hearings on S. 3017, at 1236-37 (statement of
Ralph N. George, Jr.).
39. S. 3017 § 401(a) (adding new § 601(d)(2) of ERISA).
40. S. 3017 § 401(a) (adding new § 601(d)(4) of ERISA).
41. Hearings on S. 3017, at 313 (statement of Daniel I. Halperin). Representatives of the
Labor Department testified that the Department favored efforts such as the special master plan to
extend pension coverage. However, they deferred to the Treasury Department with respect to
whether the proposal is consistent with sound tax policy. Id. 139 (statement of Robert J. Brown).
The IRS considers such an arrangement to be unworkable unless the employer plan covers all
employees and has full and immediate vesting. Id 313 (statement of Daniel I. Halperin). Treasury
officiais have noted, however, that "if a master plan with potentially discriminatory standards
were permitted to be qualified without individual examination, appropriate sanctions for market-
ing and establishing discriminatory plans would have to be developed." Id
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many employers from adopting SMPs. A more refined approach could
be utilized by the administering agency in deciding whether a particu-
lar SMP should be qualified. For example, an SMP could be required
to have several vesting schedules, with faster schedules applicable to
smaller employers who meet certain criteria. Indeed, it may be appro-
priate to impose certain sanctions on the party responsible for market-
ing an SMP with, for example, an inappropriate vesting schedule for a
particular employer sponsor.42
A number of other suggestions have been advanced for improving
the SMP proposal. One is to reduce further the paperwork and admin-
istrative burdens, the costs of which are passed on by the master spon-
sor to the employer sponsor.43 Another is to eliminate the
denomination of the master sponsor as "administrator," "named fiduci-
ary" and "investment manager" and, instead, to set out the specific re-
sponsibilities that are to be shifted to the master sponsor.' Other
42. As the Halperin testimony noted, "[qluestions must be addressed concerning the type of
sanction, the effective date of the sanction, and the party on whom the sanction is to be imposed."
Id
43. Id. 747, 1387 (statements of William T. Gibb and Theodore R. Groom).
44. A number of problems have been raised with respect to making the master sponsor "the
adminstrator," "named fiduciary" and "investment manager" of the employer sponsor's plan. As
one critic has said:
[T]here is nothing in the bill that insulates master sponsors from being sued as plan
administrators because they have prepared or distributed inaccurate reports or disclosure
materials. Although master sponsors may not ultimately be liable for such inaccuracies,
they would still have to bear the costs of defending such litigation.
In addition, under ERISA the plan administrator is required to furnish a summary
plan description to all participants. This function is normally performed by employers by
means of hand delivery at the workplace in order to avoid the burden of maintaining
accurate current records of employee home addresses. It would, therefore, be inappropri-
ate and unnecessarily burdensome to require master sponsors to perform this function.
Also, applying the plan administrator title to insurance companies would preclude
them from relying on Prohibited Transaction Exemption 77-9 to sell insurance products
or mutual fund shares to a special master plan....
Applying the "named fiduciary" title to master sponsors would also create
problems. One of the principal functions of a "named fiduciary" under ERISA is to
select and retain investment managers. However, master sponsors will generally not be
selecting and retaining others to serve as investment managers for their special master
plans. Rather, they will normally manage the assets of the plan themselves ....
Named fiduciaries are also responsible under ERISA for making decisions on
claims appeals. These appeals, however, commonly involve disputes over [workforce-
related] facts . . . the accuracy of which would be the responsibility of the employer
.... [Consequently,] the master sponsor is not only the wrong person to decide these
appeals, but may inappropriately become involved in frequent benefit claims litigation
that will result in unnecessary litigation expenses.
Id. 1387-89 (statement of Theodore IR Groom).
Also, questions have been raised with respect to Keogh plans. Permitting a distribution to an
owner-employee prior to age 59 may involve a prohibited transaction. One commentator
pointed out that a
recent IRS private ruling indicates that if the institution is offering a plan which provides
that distributions are made only pursuant to directions from the employer or from some
other "Named Fiduciary", the institution will not be liable for following such directions.
Might not an institution be foregoing its insulation by becoming Named Fiduciary?
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proposals include expanding the SMP concept to embrace defined ben-
efit plans45 and delaying action on the SMP-related provision in S.
3017 that provides that shares of pooled investment funds operated by
a bank or an insurance company that are sold to an employee benefit
plan are not securities.46 The latter provision was intended to facilitate
the interstate marketing of SMPs by banks and insurance companies
but has been attacked by the mutual fund industry as a removal of
protections for prospective sponsors of Keogh plans and IR-As.47
In light of comments received on S. 3017, a number of changes in
Id 1236 (statement of Ralph George, Jr.).
The term "investment manager," as defined under ERISA, applies to those who manage plan
assets on a discretionary basis. One commentator stated:
In many insurance company master and prototype programs, however, funding is pro-
vided through the insurance company's general account. As a result, in many cases the
insurance company would not be managing plan assets and would not, therefore, be an
investment manager within the meaning of ERISA.... [Tihe intent of this requirement
was probably to limit the group of eligible "master sponsors" to qualified financial insti-
tutions... [but the way it is proposed raises problems for insurance companies].
Id 1389 (statement of Theodore R. Groom).
45. Id 1389, 1418 (statements of Theodore R. Groom and The International Union, United
Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW)).
Concern has also been expressed that the master sponsor has no obligation with respect to
ensuring the payment of employer sponsor contributions. A solution to this problem might be the
imposition of a statutory obligation upon the master sponsor to notify the administering agency of
delinquencies. Id 407 (supplemental comments by the Pension Rights Center).
46. Id 804, 847 (statement of the Investment Company Institute). The position of the Invest-
ment Company Institute has been opposed by the American Bankers Association. Id 865 (state-
ment and additional statement of the American Bankers Association).
47. One observer has stated:
Under current law the assets of corporate plans may be collectively invested regardless of
the size of the company without registration under Section 3(a)(2) of the Securities Act of
1933. ... Congress did not exempt Keogh plan [non-corporate plan] collective trusts
specifically from registration under the 1933 Act but rather gave the SEC authority to
exempt them. The SEC . . . has not exercised this authority, at least on a class ba-
sis. . . . Banks with very few exceptions, however, have not registered their collective
trusts for Keoghs but have relied upon the intrastate exemption of Section 3(a)(l 1) of the
'33 Act.
Id 866-67 (statement of the American Bankers Association). Most banks that have established
collective trusts for Keogh plans accordingly market them ofily intrastate.
The SMP proposal is written so that all small employers, regardless of the business organiza-
tion, would be able to adopt the plan. Banks and insurance companies that want to market SMPs
to partnerships and pool the funds, but want to avoid registering under the 1933 Act, would con-
tinue to market such plans on an intrastate basis. The removal of the applicability of the securities
laws to such pooled funds would permit the interstate marketing of SMPs to small non-corporate
employers.
Mutual funds representatives claim that S. 3017 would permit banks
to advertise interests in their pooled investment funds to employee benefit Keogh plans
and IRAs, with no restraints whatever imposed by ERISA or the federal banking laws
.. Banks will not be required to provide employee benefit Keogh plans and IRAs
with prospectuses... [and] allemployee benefit plans will lose the right to bring actions
under the federal securities laws for fraud and misrepresentations in connection with
their purchases of shares of pooled investment funds.
Id 836-38 (statement of the Investment Company Institute).
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the SMP proposal are contained in S. 209,48 the successor measure to S.
3017 in the Ninety-sixth Congress. S. 209 refers to the master sponsor
as a fiduciary rather than the "named fiduciary ' 4 9 and incorporates
certain elements of ERISA's "investment manager" definition into the
definition of "master sponsor" rather than requiring the master sponsor
to be an investment manager.50 S. 209 would also permit defined bene-
fit as well as defined contribution SMPs51 and would permit the adopt-
ing employer5 2 to assume responsibility for furnishing certain required
documents (such as the summary plan description) to participants, ben-
eficiaries and employees.53 In addition, S. 209 would permit a master
sponsor to seek a declaratory judgment if the Treasury Department
fails or refuses to concur with the Labor Department in approving an
SMP5 4 and would permit the Treasury Department to disapprove ret-
roactively an adopting employer's plan only if the failure to meet the
IRC's requirements resulted from the employer's intentional failure or
willful neglect. With respect to interests in certain collective invest-
ment media being considered securities, S. 209 narrows the scope of S.
3017 and requires the Secretary of Labor to promulgate regulations
protecting participants and beneficiaries of plans that are funded by
such pooled funds.56 On May 16, 1979, the Senate Labor and Human
Resources Committee approved S. 209's SMP proposal, although it
eliminated the collective investment media provision and permitted
savings and loan institutions to become SMP master sponsors.
48. S. 209. The co-sponsors' introductory statements appear at 125 CONrG. REC. S557-576
(daily ed. Jan. 24, 1979). See generally Hearings on S. 209 Be/ore the Senate Labor and Human
Resources Comm., 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
49. S. 209 § 301(a) (adding new § 601(c)(1) of ERISA).
50. S. 209 § 301(a) (adding new § 601(a)(2) of ERISA).
51. S. 209 § 301(a) (adding new § 601(a)(1) of ERISA).
52. S. 209 uses the term "adopting employer" in lieu of S. 3017's "employer sponsor." S. 209
§ 301(a) (adding new § 601(a)(3) of ERISA).
53. S. 209 § 301(a) (adding new § 601(e)(2) of ERISA).
54. S. 209 § 301(a) (adding new § 601(d)(2)(B) of ERISA).
55. S. 209 § 301(a) (adding new § 601(d)(7) of ERISA).
56. S. 209 § 154(b) (adding new §516 of ERISA). The bill provides that an interest in a
bank's single or collective trust or an insurer's separate account that is issued exclusively to em-
ployee benefit plans is not a security for purposes of the registration requirements of the 1933 and
1934 federal securities acts (the federal securities anti-fraud provisions continue to apply, how-
ever) or within the meaning of any state securities laws. Such a trust or account holding exclu-
sively plan assets shall also not be characterized as an investment company under the Investment
Company Act of 1940 or state laws regulating investment companies. In addition, the Secretary of
Labor is directed to prescribe regulations to protect participants and beneficiaries of plans wholly
or partially funded by such pooled funds. Such regulations must include standards ensuring full
and fair disclosure of all material facts and standards for accuracy in the advertising and publiciz-
ing of such pooled funds. S. 209 § 154(a)(3) (adding new § 514(d)(3) of ERISA).
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B. Tax Credit for New Plans of Small Business Employers.
Another provision of S. 3017 aimed at encouraging small employ-
ers to establish retirement plans would grant a five year declining tax
credit to small business employers5 7 who establish new58 qualified em-
ployer retirement plans.5 9 The tax credit for the first taxable year of the
new plan maintenance ° would be five percent of the amount allowable
to such an employer as a deduction for his contributions to the plan.6
The credit would decline to three percent for the succeeding two taxa-
ble years and to one percent for the next two years, no longer being
available in the sixth taxable year.62 According to Treasury Depart-
ment officials, a narrower focusing of this credit could perhaps increase
its effectiveness.6 3 However, further study of the sufficiency of informa-
tion about the gap in pension coverage is necessary so that the credit
can be fashioned to maximize new plan formation at an acceptable
level of revenue lossY4
A different tax credit concept has been proposed to confront the
phenomenon that administrative costs per participant usually increase
sharply as plan size decreases.65 The proposal would grant a continu-
ing credit for all plans. However, this credit would be calculated by
multiplying the number of participants in a plan by an inversely pro-
portional amount of money. That is, the amount of money contained
57. Such an "employer" is defined as "an employer (within the meaning of [I.R.C.] section
404) which is a small business (as determined by the Adminstrator of the Small Business Adminis-
tration under section 112 of the Small Business Act.)." S. 3017 § 304(a) (adding new I.R.C.
§ 44C(c)(2)).
58. S. 3017 § 304(a) (adding new I.R.C. §§ 446(b)(1), (2), (3)).
59. S. 3017 § 304(a) (adding new I.R.C. § 446(c)(1)). A qualified employer retirement plan
includes qualified corporate and Keogh plans. The credit is not allowed for contributions to Em-
ployee Stock Ownership Plans, see S. 3017 § 303(a) (adding new I.R.C. § 221(c)(3)), but is allowed
with respect to commencement of contributions to ongoing qualified employer retirement plans.
60. No credit would be allowable if an employer terminates a qualified employer retirement
plan at any time after January 1, 1978. This tax credit would have originally been effective for
taxable years beginning after December 31, 1978.
61. S. 3017 § 304(a) (adding new I.R.C. § 44C(b)). I.R.C. § 404 permits the employer deduc-
tion.
62. S. 3017 § 304(a) (adding new I.R.C. § 446(b)).
63. Hearings on S. 3017, at 312. (statement of Daniel I. Halperin). The credit could be
targeted to "employees whose work force has a low average pay, those whose income is below
specified levels, or those who have a relatively small amount of assets." Id
64. Id 311-12.
65. Id 1359. (statement of Price Waterhouse & Co.). A study completed for the Labor De-
partment entitled Assessment of the Impact of ERISA on the Administrative Costs of Small Retire-
ment Plans demonstrates that economies of scale constitute a major influence on plan
adminstrative costs. See Estimates of4dministrative Costs of Small Retirement Plans, 1974-1976,
U.S. Department of Labor, Labor Managment Services Administration (May 1, 1978) (mimeo-
graph), for the Labor Department's comments on the Price Waterhouse study.
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in the credit would increase as the plan size decreased. 6-This credit
functions as a subsidy to small plans to cover the increased administra-
tive costs attributable to ERISA 7
The proposed new plan tax credit in S. 3017 has been criticized
because it would, in effect, penalize those employers who already have
established pension plans and reward those who have not .6  The credit
has also been opposed because it would discriminate among employers
participating in multiemployer plans solely on the basis of their size.69
The proposed credit could be improved, in the view of some, by mak-
ing it applicable only to new defined benefit pension plans that better
protect employees.70
In an attempt to target the credit to those small employers who,
but for the tax incentive, could not afford to establish pension plans, the
revised proposal before the Ninety-sixth Congress, as contained in S.
209, would modify S. 3017's definition of "small business employer."
Under the new bill, such an employer would be one who, during the
taxable year immediately preceding the taxable year in which the credit
is first claimed, had a monthly average of fewer than 100 employees. In
addition, the "small business employer," if a corporation, must have
earnings and profits, or if an unincorporated trade or business or a
partnership, must have net profits, during the period just described
equal to no greater than $50,000.71
C. Simpflled Employee Pension.
The third important proposal advanced during the Ninety-fifth
Congress to increase retirement plan coverage was contained in S.
3140. The bill would expand the existing concept of employer-spon-
sored IRAs71 by authorizing deductible employer contributions to such
an IRA. The employer contribution to each such IRA would be lim-
ited to the lesser of fifteen percent of gross income or $7,500, the pres-
ent Keogh plan limits. 73
66. Hearings on S. 3017, at 1358-59 (statement of Price Waterhose & Co.).
67. Id 1358.
68. Id 358-366 (statement of Bert Seidman).
69. Id 421 (statement of Robert A. Georgine).
70. Id 701, 1417 (statements of American Society of Pension Actuaries and UAW).
71. S. 209 § 204 (adding new I.R.C. § 44D(c)(2)). See generally Hearings on S. 209, supra
note 48; Hearings on S. 7, S. 95, S. 209, and S. 557Before the Subconm on Private Pension Plans
and Employee Fringe Benefts of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 96th Cong., Ist. Sess. (1979).
72. Employer sponsored IRAs are provided for under I.R.C. § 408(c). Deductible contribu- -
tions to these IRAs can be made only by employees, not employers. See Hearings on S, 3140
Before the Subcommn on Private Pension Plans and Employee Benots of the Senate Finance
Comm, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1978) (statement of Daniel I. Halperin).
73. S. 3140 § 3.
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The simplified plan, which is a defined contribution plan funded
exclusively by employer-sponsored IRAs,74 would have to meet a com-
bination of requirements under the IRC's IRA and qualified Keogh
plan provisions." Consequently, participation would have to be non-
discriminatory, the maximum participation requirement would be
three years of service, and employer contributions would be fully and
immediately vested.76 If an employer's contribution for an employee
were less than the annual IRA limitation of the lesser of $1,500 or
fifteen percent of annual compensation, the individual could contribute
the difference.77 An individually designed, simplified plan would be
subject to IRS approval and existing reporting and disclosure require-
ments.
78
S. 3140 was significantly modified by the Senate Finance Commit-
tee, 7 9 and, as amended, was enacted into law as part of the Revenue
Act of 1978.80 The final version, which was called a simplified em-
ployee pension, shifted from the employer-sponsored IRA to the more
common employee-sponsored IRA or individual retirement annuity as
the basic funding vehicle.8 The limitation on deductions for employer
contributions to the IRA would be the present Keogh plan limits, and
the employee could contribute the difference between the individual
IRA limitation and the employer contribution.82 The employer would
be entitled to a deduction for his contributions to each IRA under IRC
§ 404, and the employee would be entitled to a deduction for the em-
ployer contribution to his or her IRA under IRC § 219.3 The em-
ployee deduction would be allowed even though the employee was an
active participant in a qualified plan, a governmental plan or a tax-
sheltered annuity. However, make-up contributions would not be per-
mitted.84
Under the version enacted, employer contributions must be made
under a written formula followed by the employer, and the account or
74. Id § 2(4).
75. Id §§ 2(4), 3(a).
76. Hearings on S. 3140, supra note 72 (statement of Daniel I. Halperin).
77. S. 3140 § 3. This provision embodies a limited IRA concept in which the employee can
supplement employer contributions up to the IRA limit.
78. S. 3140 § 3(a).
79. 1978 SENATE REPORT 91-93, reprintedin [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 6854-56.
80. See note 22 supra.
81. H.R. REP. No. 1800, supra note 22, at 211-12; 1978 SENATE REPORT 91-93, reprinted in
[1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 6854-56.
82. H.R. REp. No. 1800, supra note 22, at 211-12; 1978 SENATE REPORT 92, reprinted in
[1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 6855.
83. Pub. L. No. 95-600, §§ 152(c) & (f), 92 Stat. 2763 (1978).
84. 1978 SENATE REPORT 93, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 6856.
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annuity must be maintained solely by the employee. The formula must
provide nondiscriminatory contributions for a calendar year for each
employee who has attained age twenty-five and has performed service
for the employer during any part of three of the immediately preceding
five calendar years." The employer's formula may provide, however,
that employer contributions for each employee be reduced by the
amount of the employer's share of Social Security tax. The Secretary
of the Treasury is authorized to require such reports as may be re-
quired to carry out the purposes of these provisions.8 6
The final version of the S. 3140 proposal apparently constitutes an
attempt to cut down on the reporting and tax qualification require-
ments that were applicable under S. 3140. The final version is also an
attempt to avoid the possible application of Title I of ERISA to such
simplified employee pensions.
II. PROPOSALS FOR THE EXPANSION OF RETIREMENT PLAN
BENEFITS
As a complement to the expansion of private plan coverage, the
Ninety-fifth and Ninety-sixth Congresses have looked into ways to ex-
pand private plan beneits in an attempt to meet the ever-increasing
need for retirement income. This article now turns to a discussion of
these legislative proposals to expand benefits.
A. Proposals/or Increasing Employee Contributions to Plans.
One means of increasing retirement benefits is to expand the role
that employees play in contributing directly toward their own retire-
ment security.8 7 Presently, an employee who is not an active partici-
pant in a qualified pension plan, a tax-deferred annuity maintained by
a tax-exempt institution or a governmental plan can make annual, de-
ductible contributions to an IRA or an individual retirement annuity
up to the lesser of $1,500 or fifteen percent of compensation.8" De-
pending upon the terms of a qualified pension plan, an employee may
also presently make mandatory or voluntary contributions to his or her
plan, but generally no deduction or exclusion is available.8 9 Certain
85. Employer contributions are generally considered to be discriminatory unless they bear a
uniform relationship to the first $100,000 of each employee's total compensation.
86. H.R. REP. No. 1800, supra note 22, at 211-12; 1978 SENATE REPORT 93, reprinted in
[1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 6856.
87. This assumes that employers will not reduce employer-paid benefits as employee contri-
butions increase.
88. I.R.C. § 408.
89. 1978 SENATE REPORT 88, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 6851.
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tax incentives are provided, however, with respect to employee contri-
butions to certain types of employee benefit plans including unfunded,
nonqualified, deferred compensation plans, "cafeteria plans," and so-
called "cash and deferred" profit sharing plans.90
Three tax incentive concepts have been advanced in an attempt to
encourage greater employee contributions to retirement plans. One
would provide a deduction for employee contributions to qualified
pension plans or IRAs."1 Another would permit a deduction for em-
ployee contributions to limited IRA arrangements. 92 The third would
permit homemakers to establish IRAs for themselves.93 These ideas
are aimed at increasing self-provided retirement benefits but may also
result in increased retirement plan coverage.94
1. Deductionsfor Employee Contribution to Plans or Full Contri-
bution IRA4s. (a) Williams-Javitsproposal. S. 3017 would permit a de-
duction for employee contributions to a qualified employer retirement
plan95 not to exceed the lesser of ten percent of compensation included
in gross income or $1,000, reduced by twenty percent of the amount by
which adjusted gross income exceeds $30,000.96 This deduction would
be available for contributions to private as well as to government
plans.97 Qualified plans would be required to accept employee contri-
90. Id at 89; see Pub. L. No. 95-600, §§ 132, 134, 135, 92 Stat. 2763 (1978). During hearings,
Treasury Department officials stated that the law on the tax treatment of employee contributions
to tax-favored employee benefit plans "now goes in many directions, due to the variety of types of
employee benefit plans in existence and the varying approaches to the treatment of employee
contributions to them." Hearings on S. 3017, at 307 (statement of Daniel I. Halperin). Earlier, the
Treasury had suggested that Congress and the Treasury
[t]ogether begin to give serious consideration to the possibility of deductions and exclu-
sions for employee contributions to all types of tax-favored deferred compensation ar-
rangements and fringe benefit plans. We pointed out that it seems to us that a unified
system could be developed under which amounts set aside at the employee's election are
deductible or excludable if the arrangements are nondiscriminatory with respect to both
coverage of employees and benefits (or contributions) actually provided and where ex-
cessive deferral is not created.
Id.
91. See S. 3017; H.R. 12561, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REc. H3622 (daily ed. May 4,
1978) (sponsored by Congressman Conable); S. 3288, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REc.
S10683 (daily ed. July 13, 1978) (sponsored by Senator Dole).
92. See S. 2004, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. S13713 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1977).
93. See H.R. 4649, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REc. H2582 (daily ed. March 24, 1977)
(sponsored by Congressman Trible); S. 1783,95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. Rnc. S11106 (daily
ed. June 29, 1977) (sponsored by Senator Anderson).
94. For example, the homemaker IRA, see text accompanying notes 148-53 infra, is a propo-
sal to increase self-provided retirement benefits, but it also is a concept for expanding retirement
plan coverage because it makes IRAs available to a new class of individuals.
95. S. 3017 § 303(a) (adding new I.R.C. § 221(c)(3), defining a qualified employer retirement
plan).
96. S. 3017 § 303(a).
97. Id
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butions and place them in separate accounts.9" Discriminatory use of
the deduction would be limited by the twenty percent offset require-
ment that would deny the deduction to individuals having adjusted
gross incomes exceeding $35,000. 9 9 The deduction would be of greatest
benefit to those employees who do not stay long enough with an em-
ployer to vest fully and to participants in low-benefit plans who will
receive minimal retirement benefits. 1°°
Business groups as well as organized labor have criticized the pro-
posal's requirements that plans must accept employee contributions
and keep them in separate accounts. They claim that the administra-
tive burden of compliance will be great, particularly for defined benefit
and multiemployer plans. 101 There is some merit to this contention.
However, the elimination of such requirements would mean that em-
ployees would be able to make deductible contributions only if permit-
ted by those who administer the plans.
Concerns have also been expressed that employers may feel less
responsibility to provide retirement income for their workers if deducti-
ble employee contributions are permitted.'0 2 Similarly, emphasis upon
employee contributions may lead employers to require contributions as
a condition to participating in the plans. Mandatory contributions
would tend to disadvantage low income workers, who frequently can-
not make such contributions and therefore forfeit the chance for a min-
imal employer-provided pension.'0 3  Some, though, believe that
allowing deductible employee contributions will facilitate benefit im-
provements. 04
(b) Conable-Doleproposals. H.R. 125611 and S. 32881' would
allow an employee who is an active participant in a qualified plan to
make a deductible contribution either to that plan or to an IRA of the
lesser of ten percent of compensation for the taxable year or $1,000.107
The deduction would be available without regard to income level, al-
98. S. 3017 § 303(c) (adding new I.R.C. § 401(k)).
99. Id In the Treasury Department's view, this 20% offset can still result in discriminatory
utilization of the tax benefit accorded by S. 3017. Because phase-out begins only at $30,000, an
individual well above the median income level can make a full $1,000 contribution. Hearings on
S. 3017, at 309 (statement of Daniel L Halperin).
100. 124 CONo. REc. S6589 (daily ed., May 1, 1978) (statement of Senator Javits).
101. See, e.g., Hearings on S. 3017, at 421-22, 767, 1356 (statements of Robert A. Georgine,
William T. Gibb and Price Waterhouse & Co.).
102. Id 1419 (statement of UAW).
103. Id
104. Id 1355 (statement of Price Waterhouse & Co.).
105. H.R. 12561, supra note 91.
106. S. 3288, supra note 91.
107. H.R. 12561, supra note 91, § (a)(l).
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though discrimination concerns are dealt with by treating employee
contributions to the plan as those of the employer.10 8 The deduction
would not be available to self-employed individuals or participants in
government plans, 10 9 and the employer would not be required to accept
employee contributions.10
The Senate Finance Committee adopted a variation of this con-
cept in its version of the Revenue Act of 1978, though it was subse-
quently deleted in conference."' The Committee variation would have
allowed deductible employee contributions either to qualified retire-
ment plans or IRAs. However, the annual deduction would be the
lesser of ten percent of the employee's compensation and $1,000 for
voluntary contributions or $100 for mandatory contributions.' 2 The
lower limit for mandatory contributions reflects the concern that a de-
duction for such contributions would encourage shifting the burden of
providing plan benefits from employer to employee." 3
Under the Finance Committee's version, employee contributions
made either to the IRA or to the qualified retirement plan would gener-
ally be treated as contributions by the employer." 4 Such treatment
would apply for purposes of the IRC's antidiscrimination rules and
limits on benefits and contributions. 1 5 Contributions made to an IRA
by a participating employee would be deductible only if funds are
transferred to the IRA from the employer. 6 Transferring funds by or
through the employer permits appropriate recordkeeping and verifica-
tion of prohibited discrimination.' I Employers would not be required
to accept employee contributions.
During testimony on H.R. 12561, after the Finance Committee
108. Id § (b).
109. Id § (a).
110. Id
111. See H.R. 13511, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 151 (1978) (as reported by Mr. Long, with an
amendment); 1978 SENATE REPORT 88-91, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
6851-54; H.R. REP. No. 1800, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
112. See 1978 SENATE REPORT 89, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 6852.
113. Id
114. Id 90, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6853.
115. Id "Employee contributions are not treated as employer contributions for purposes of
determining the employer's deduction for its own contributions to the plan or for purposes of
applying the vesting and benefit accrual rules under the Code." Id
116. Id
An employer would not be able to hold funds for more than a reasonable period of time
before transferring them to the IRA. At the option of the employer, the employee could
be limited to a choice of one or a few IRAs, or the employee might be allowed to choose
whatever IRA he or she wishes. However, funds could not be transferred to an IRA
which is a fixed premium annuity or endowment contract.
Id
117. Id 90-91, reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6853-54.
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had adopted its modified proposal, Treasury officials voiced reserva-
tions as to the feasibility of channelling employee contributions
through the employer with respect to multiemployer plans.118 More-
over, the revenue impact of the bill, calculated at approximately $875
million, raises serious concern because the largest portion of such im-
pact, approximately $500 million, derives from deductions for em-
ployee contributions that are currently nondeductible.' In addition,
the Labor Department was said to be concerned about the application
of fiduciary rules to amounts withheld by the employer prior to the
transfer to an IRA. 120
Early in the Ninety-sixth Congress, Senators Dole and Nelson in-
troduced S. 75,121 which would allow a deduction for employee contri-
butions to certain retirement plans122 or to IRAs equal to the lesser of
ten percent of compensation includible in gross income or $1,000.11
Like the earlier Dole proposal, S. 75's deduction would not be available
to the self-employed or to participants in government plans.124 How-
ever, unlike the earlier proposal, discrimination in favor of the highly
compensated 125 would be controlled through a test 126 requiring that the
actual deferral percentage for highly compensated employees meet
standards similar to those required for certain cash or deferred arrange-
ments under the Revenue Act of 1978.127 Failure to meet this test
would result in highly compensated employees not being allowed to
deduct their contributions. 128  S. 75 makes no distinction between
mandatory and voluntary employee contributions.
A similar provision was proposed by Senators Williams and Javits
in S. 209.'12 This proposal, however, differs from the Dole-Nelson
measure in that it would not allow an employee deduction if, under the
118. Hearings an H. 12561 Before the Subcomr on Oversight ofthe House CoMnm on Ways
and Means, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1978) (statement of Daniel I. Halperin).
119. Id
120. Id
121. S. 75, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. S263 (daily ed. Jan. 18, 1979).
122. Id § a (adding new I.R.C. § 221(a)).
123. S. 75, supra note 121, § a (adding new I.R.C. § 221(c)(1)).
124. Id
125. A highly compensated participant is defined as
any participant who is more highly compensated than two-thirds of all participants but
only if such participant's compensation for a plan year equals or exceeds the salary of an
employee of the United States who is compensated at a rate equal to the annual rate paid
for step 1 of Grade GS-14.
S. 75, supra note 121, § a (adding new LR.C. § 221(c)(7)).
126. S. 754, sup ra note 121, § a (adding new I.R.C. § 221(c)(6)).
127. Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 135, 92 Stat. 2763.
128. S. 75, supra note 121, § a, (adding new I.R.C. § 221(b)(4)).
129. S. 209 § 203. See generall, Hearings on . 209, supra note 48; Hearings on S. 75, supra
note 71; STAFF OF JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, DESCRIPTION OF S. 75, S. 94, S. 209 AND S.
[Vol. 1979:615
Vol. 1979:615] PRI VA TE RETIREMENT BENEFITS
terms of a plan not in existence on January 1, 1978, employee contribu-
tions are mandatory or employer contributions are not made unless
contributions by employees are made.13 The Williams-Javits proposal
is also different in that it defines more broadly the highly compensated
group.1 3 1 This proposal was approved on May 16, 1979 by the Senate
Labor and Human Resources Committee.
A third related proposal advanced early in the Ninety-sixth Con-
gress is Senator Bentsen's bill, S. 557, which would permit an active
participant in a qualified private pension plan to take a deduction for
his or her contribution to the plan or to an IRA equal to the lesser of 15
percent of compensation or $1,500.132 This amount, the present IRA
contribution limit, is larger than the deductible amount that S. 75 and
S. 209 would permit. S. 557 also differs from the other two bills in that
it contains no antidiscrimination test.' 33
2. Deductions for Employee Contributions to Limited IR,4 Ar-
rangements. 34 (a) Arrangement to assistparticpants in low benefitplan.
A number of proposals were made in the Ninety-fifth Congress to al-
low an employee participating in a qualified pension plan to make a
deductible IRA contribution equal to the difference between the em-
ployer contribution on his or her behalf and the IRA deduction limits
of the lesser of $1,500 or fifteen percent of compensation. 135 The pro-
557 RELATING TO DEDUCTIONS FOR INDIVIDUAL RETIREMENT SAVINGS AND TREATMENT OF
TAx-QUALIFIED EMPLOYEE PLANS (Comm. Print 1979).
130. S. 209 § 203 (adding new I.R.C. § 221(b)(5)).
131. S. 209 § 203 (adding new I.R.C. § 221(c)(7)). S. 209 requires that the highly compensated
participant be compensated at a rate equal to the annual rate paid for step 1 of grade GS-12 rather
than GS-14.
132. S. 557, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REc. S2187 (daily ed. March 7, 1979). See gener-
ally Hearings on S. 75, supra note 71; DESCRIPTION OF S. 75, supra note 129.
133. S. 557, supra note 132.
134. The term "Limited IRA Arrangement" is intended to refer to proposals for making the
amount of the employee's deductible IRA contribution dependent upon either the size of the
employer contribution to the qualified plan or the full vesting of the participant's accrued benefit
under the plan. The term "Limited Employee Retirement Account" (LERA) has not been used to
avoid possible confusion. During the 94th Congress, the House passed H.R. 10612 (the 1975 Tax
Reform Bill), 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REC. H111754 (1975), see H. REP. No. 94-658, 94th
Cong., Ist Sess. (1975), which, among other things, would have permitted a deductible contribu-
tion by an employee who was an active plan participant equal to the difference between the em-
ployer's annual contribution to the plan and the IRA limit. The deductible employee contribution
could have been made either to an IRA or to a LERA that was an account in the employer's plan
(the plan had to be established prior to ERISA's date of enactment-September 2, 1974) to which
the employee contribution would be credited. Since 1976, the term LERA has occasionally been
used to refer to the IRA to which the difference between the employer plan contribution and the
IRA contribution limitation could be contributed. Because of the ambiguity of the term LERA, it
will not be used.
135. S. 2004, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REc. S13713 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1977) (sponsored
by Senator Inouye); S. 2462, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REC. S876 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 1978)
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posals are intended primarily to permit employees covered by low con-
tribution/benefit plans to supplement their retirement benefits. 136 They
would also have the effect of discouraging employees from foregoing
participation in their employer's plan and establishing IRAs, thereby
jeopardizing the plan's tax qualification.
While these proposals may be viable if the employer's plan is a
defined contribution plan in which the employer's annual contribution
on behalf of each employee can be readily calculated, the concept be-
comes impractical when the employer's plan is a defined benefit
plan.' 37 In such a plan, individual accounts for each employee are not
maintained, and the calculation to determine the employer contribu-
tion on behalf of each employee is complex. In the Senate Finance
Committee's view, such arrangements would "necessarily result in sub-
stantial complexity and administrative problems for employers, em-
ployees and the Internal Revenue Service."' 38  The arrangements
would also not assist those employees who participate in plans with
contributions exceeding IRA limits but who, because of frequent job
changes, never vest their accrued benefits. It thus appears that these
proposals do not recommend themselves very highly and should be dis-
counted accordingly.
(b) Arrangement to assist mobile employees. H.R. 13576131 would
permit a participant in a qualified nongovernmental plan to make de-
ductible contributions to an IRA in an amount not exceeding the IRA
limits until the participant is fully vested under the employer's plan.'40
Under this bill, the employer would be required to notify the employee
when 100% vesting occurs and of the amount of accrued benefits at the
(sponsored by Senator Dole); H.R. 5147, 95th Cong., Ist Sess., 123 CONG. RIc. H2227 (daily ed.
Mar. 16, 1977) (sponsored by Congressman Oberstar); H.R. 7587, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG.
REC. H5365 (daily ed. June 2, 1977) (sponsored by Congressman Wolfi).
136. See, e.g., 123 CONG. REc. H1545 (daily ed. Mar. 16, 1977) (statement of Congressman
Oberstar).
137. See Hearings on S. 3017, at 306 (statement of Daniel I. Halperin).
138. 1978 SENATE REPORT 90.
139. H.R. 13576 (sponsored by Congressman Corman). This bill was previously introduced as
H.R. 13347, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REc. H6295 (daily ed. June 29, 1978). The concept
contained in H.R. 13576 and H.R. 13347 was reintroduced by Congressman Corman in the
Ninety-sixth Congress as H.R. 628,96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. Rac. H173 (daily ed. Jan. 18,
1979). H.R. 628 also proposes a deduction for employee contributions to qualified plans. The
companion Senate bill is S. 1428, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. S8665 (daily ed. June 27,
1979), which was introduced by Senator Cranston.
140. H.R. 13576 § 2 (adding new I.R.C. §§ 219(a), (b) & (c)). The contribution can be made to
a section 408(a) IRA, a section 408(b) individual retirement annuity, or a section 409 retirement
bond.
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time from both employer and employee contributions. 141 If the em-
ployee ceases to be an active plan participant, he or she would be
treated as fully vested in the accrued benefit under the plan.142 An
employee's IRA contribution would be treated as employer contribu-
tions to the plan for antidiscrimination purposes.
143
When full vesting occurs, there would be a distribution from the
IRA equal to the lesser of the employee's vested projected benefit
under the employer's plan or the fair market value of the employee's
interest in the IRA.'" This distribution would be taxed at ordinary
rates. After the distribution, the employee could continue to contribute
to the plan.145 Consequently, in a more generous plan, there would be
no further employee contributions to the IRA because plan contribu-
tions would exceed the IRA limits.
This proposal is superior in at least two ways to the low benefit
arrangement previously discussed.'4 6 First, it permits highly mobile
employees, who never vest under qualified plans with contributions su-
perior to the IRA limits, to contribute toward their own retirement se-
curity, yet, it permits participants in low benefit plans to continue
making deductible contributions even after they fully vest under the
plan. Second, the proposal requires that the potentially complex calcu-
lation of the employer contribution to the plan be performed when the
employee fully vests rather than every year before the full vesting
year. 147 However, from the IRS's vantage point, the proposal may be
less desirable because participants will be able to take larger deductions
during the years in which they are not fully vested, although the IRS
will be able to tax the difference between the deductions under the two
methods when full vesting finally occurs. The proposal may also be
more difficult to explain to participants and could result in administra-
tive difficulties.
3. Homemaker IRAs. H.R. 4649148 and S. 1783141 would allow a
spouse who has no compensation for a taxable year to establish his or
her own IRA and make the presently deductible IRA contributions.
141. H.R. 13576 § 2 (adding new I.R.C. § 219(0(4)). This section does not apply to multiem-
ployer deferred benefit plans and church plans.
142. H.R. 13576 § 3 (adding new I.R.C. § 409A(c)(5)).
143. H.R. 13576 § 4.
144. Id § 3 (adding new I.R.C. §§ 409A(a) and (c)). This distribution rule would not apply to
multiemployer defined benefit plans and church plans. Id § 3 (adding new I.R.C. § 409A(b)).
145. Id § 2 (adding new I.R.C. § 219(b)).
146. See text accompanying notes 135-38 supra.
147. The calculation, however, would apparently have to be done annually for fully vested
participants in plans where the IRA limits exceed contributions under the plan.
148. See note 93 supra.
149. See note 93 supra.
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The uncompensated spouse would be able to make his or her own IRA
contributions regardless of whether the other spouse participated in an
IRA or another retirement program. 150
In light of the present usage of IRAs by higher income individu-
als,15 1 there are grounds for anticipating that the homemaker IRA
could possibly provide another tax-shelter for upper income couples
and families.' 52 But despite this concern, interest in the proposal con-
tinues as demonstrated by the introduction of S. 94 and H.R. 1542 in
the Ninety-sixth Congress.'53
B. Tax Creditfor Improved Plans.
There has been a continuing interest in Congress in requiring as
rapid vesting of accrued benefits as feasible.' 54 More rapid vesting in-
creases the chances that an employee will have an adequate pension
upon retirement and lessens the need for developing complex schemes
for increasing portability or reciprocity between plans. Of course, more
rapid vesting will generally increase the cost of providing a pension
benefit. 5  It was in light of this concern about more rapid vesting that
the notion of an "improved plan" was put forward in S. 3017.
A plan would be certified as an improved plan if, for the plan year
for which certification is requested, there has been a "substantial im-
provement" in benefits compared to the preceding plan year and if em-
ployee rights exceed Title I's minimum standards.156 The plan must
permit "significantly earlier participation" than ERISA presently re-
quires and "significantly more rapid" vesting than ERISA's "least
rapid rate."'157 As an alternative to improved participation and vesting,
150. 123 CONG. REc. H2582 (daily ed. Mar. 24, 1977) (statement of Congressman Trible). See
generally Hearings on Individual Retirement Accounts and IRS Plan Termination Survey Before the
Subcomm. on Oversight ofthe House Comm on Ways and Means, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
151. See Hearings on Individual Retirement Accounts, supra note 150, at 49, 54, 58 (statement
of Daniel I. Halperin).
152. But see id at 70-75.
153. S. 94, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REc. S288 (daily ed. Jan. 18, 1979); H.R. 1542,
96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REc. H317 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 1979). See generally Hearings on S.
75, supra note 71; DESCRIFPTION OF S. 75, supra note 129.
154. See 123 CONG. REc. S13528, S13532 (daily ed., Aug. 4, 1977) (statement of Senator Ja-
vits).
155. But see text accompanying note 162 infra. S. 3017 attempts to subsidize the potential cost
increase of faster vesting by providing a five percent tax credit to employers who establish im-
proved qualified employer retirement plans rather than directly requiring, for example, 100% vest-
ing after five years of service. S. 3017 § 305 (adding new I.R.C. § 44D).
156. S. 3017 § 124(a). Under S. 3017, certification would be by the new Employee Benefits
Commission.
157. Id § 124(b)(1)(2). See section 202 of ERISA for minimum participation requirements
and section 203 of ERISA for minimum vesting standards.
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a plan may provide "some other significant improvement" that is "at
least equivalent" to the participation and vesting improvements.1 58
The draftsmen of the improved plan credit realized that there were
technical problemsi5 9 with the proposal and that it gave too much dis-
cretion to the administering agency.1 60 They were also aware that there
was an equitable problem with providing a tax credit prospectively to
employers who may be less generous with their employees and denying
a credit to employers who may have already provided five year, i00%
vesting. 161
One telling criticism of the proposal was raised with respect to the
granting of the tax credit. Since cost does not necessarily increase be-
cause of improved participation and vesting, should the improved plan
credit be permitted if vesting is improved but cost is not increased? 62
For example, a plan with low employee turnover could change from
ten year full vesting to five year full vesting with little increased cost. 163
Or, a profit-sharing plan with forfeiture reallocations could shift from
ten year to eight year, 100% vesting with no cost increase. 64 It may not
be appropriate to grant a credit where, as in these two examples, em-
ployee rights are increased, but there are no increased employer contri-
butions to subsidize. If the credit is to be granted only where there are
cost increases, the administering agency will have to face complex actu-
arial problems.1 65 No similar provision has been introduced in the
Ninety-sixth Congress, and it seems clear that further refinement of this
proposal is necessary.
C. Joint and Survivor Annuity Protection.
ERISA presently specifies that if a plan provides an annuity form
of benefit, the annuity must be in the form of a qualified joint and
survivor annuity. 6 6 The participant is entitled to "opt out" and select a
single life annuity if that better suits his or her needs. 67 During the
period from the later of the plan's earliest retirement age or ten years
before the normal retirement age, participants must have the option of
158. S. 3017 § 124(b)(3).
159. For example, what is the least rapid vesting rate under ERISA?
160. The proposal provided no guidance on what would constitute "significantly earlier partic-
ipation" or "significant improvement." See S. 3017 § 124(b).
161. See Hearings on S. 3017, at 421, 1417-18 (statements of Robert A. Georgine and the
UAW).
162. See id 312, 1359-60 (statements of Daniel I. Halperin and Price Waterhouse & Co.).
163. Id 312 (statement of Daniel I. Halperin).
164. Id 1359 (statement of Price Waterhouse & Co.).
165. Id 312 (statement of Daniel I. Halperin).
166. ERISA § 205(a).
167. Id § 205(e).
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electing joint and survivor annuity coverage. 168 If the participant so
elects, the additional cost of the survivor protection can be charged to
the participant through an actuarial reduction of the normal form of
annuity. 6 9 ERISA provides that, in the absence of joint and survivor
annuity protection, vested, employer-derived benefits can be forfeited
because of the participant's death, whether before or after retire-
ment. 1
70
In the view of many, one shortcoming in ERISA's protection
against benefit forfeitures through death is the inapplicability of the
joint and survivor annuity protection to the participant during most of
his or her working life. Under the current rules, if an employee who is
fully vested after thirty-five years of service dies shortly before an early
retirement age of sixty-two, the plan is not required to pay a survivor's
benefit to the spouse. 17 1 S. 3017 attempts to overcome this lack of pro-
tection by requiring that in the case of a participant who dies and who
is at least fifty percent vested under a plan that provides an annuity
form of benefit, a survivor's benefit based upon the vested benefit must
be paid to the surviving spouse when the participant could have
reached his or her earliest retirement age or sooner.172 In a similar
case, under a plan that does not provide for an annuity benefit, a lump
sum distribution to the surviving spouse of the participant's account
balance would be required not later than sixty days after the end of the
plan year in which the participant dies. 173 The proposal essentially es-
tablishes an earlier date for the applicability of the automatic joint and
survivor protection.
Commentators have observed that, particularly with respect to de-
fined benefit plans, 174 the proposed change would mandate in effect a
preretirement death benefit as an ancillary benefit of a pension plan. 75
Some pension plans presently provide such death benefits, but in many
cases employers provide death benefits through separate life insurance
plans that can be tailored to provide more effective coverage for young
168. Id § 205(c)(1).
169. Id § 205(h).
170. Id § 203(a)(3)(A).
171. Hearings on S. 3017, at 406 (supplemental comments by the Pension Rights Center).
172. S. 3017 § 238. See H.R. 3340, 96th Cong. 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REc. H1860 (daily ed.
Mar. 29, 1979).
173. S. 3017 § 238.
174. The bill essentially does not change current practice respecting defined contribution
plans. Generally, the deceased participant's account balance is paid to a beneficiary. Hearings on
S. 3017, at 1350 (statement by Price Waterhouse & Co.).
175. Id 580, 1350-51 (statements of American Academy of Actuaries, Price Waterhouse &
Co.).
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employees. 176 Tying death benefits to vested benefits could result in the
making of minimal payments to survivors and would administratively
burden the pension plan. 77
However, employers could react to the S. 3017 proposal by moving
their group life coverage into their pension plans, resulting in loss by
employees of the $50,000 tax exclusion applicable to life insurance ben-
efits under section 79 of the IRC.1 78 Employers could also conceivably
impose mandatory employee contributions to pension plans to cover
the additional cost of the expanded joint and survivor annuity protec-
tion.179 Cost estimates by interested groups have ranged from a ten to
fifteen percent increase in cost, but there are grounds for believing that
these estimates may be too high 180 Whatever the cost increase would
be, it would impact most heavily on those employers who have pro-
vided faster than minimum vesting, 81 including small employers who
have been forced by the IRS to adopt so-called 4-40 vesting.18 2
The S. 3017 joint and survivor annuity provision has been modi-
fied during the Ninety-sixth Congress in S. 209 to take account of some
of the criticisms leveled at the original proposal. S. 209 would make
the expanded survivor protection applicable in the case of a participant
who is credited with ten years of service for vesting purposes rather
than one who is at least fifty percent vested.1 83 A plan that provides an
annuity as the normal form of benefit would be required to pay a de-
ferred annuity to the surviving spouse of such a participant who dies,
and could not make a distribution earlier than the annuity starting date
except if the payment, whether in the form of a lump sum or install-
176. Id 581, 784-85, 1351 (statements of American Academy of Actuaries, American Council
on Life Insurance and Health Insurance Association of America, Price Waterhouse & Co.).
177. Id 784-85, 1351-52, 1422-23 (statements of American Council on Life Insurance and
Health Association of America, Price Waterhouse & Co., the UAW).
178. Id 785 (statement of American Council on Life Insurance and Health Insurance Associa-
tion of America).
179. Id 1352 (statement of Price Waterhouse & Co.).
180. Id 420, 1001 (statements of Robert A. Georgine, Association of Private Pension and
Welfare Plans). Estimates made for the Senate Labor Subcommittee place the increase at between
two and five percent of cost.
181. Id 785, 1352 (statements of American Council on Life Insurance and Health Insurance
Association of America, Price Waterhouse & Co.).
182. 4-40 vesting refers to the faster vesting schedule that the IRS may require certain employ-
ers to adopt in order to avoid actual or potential discrimination in favor of employees who are
officers, shareholders, or highly compensated. This faster vesting schedule could require 40% vest-
ing after four years of employment, an additional five percent for each of the next two years, and
an additional 10% for each of the following five years. See Rev. Proc. 75-49, 1975-2 C.B. 584;
Rev. Proc. 76-11, 1976-1 C.B. 550.
183. S. 209 § 127(a)(2) (adding new §§ 205(b)(1) and (c) ofERISA). See generally Hearngs on
. 209, supra note 48.
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ments, did not exceed $2,000.184 A plan that does not provide an annu-
ity as the normal form of benefit would be required with respect to such
a deceased participant to distribute the benefit to the surviving spouse
in a lump sum or in installments not later than sixty days after the end
of the plan year in which the participant dies or to distribute the benefit
in some other manner agreed upon by the spouse and the plan.1 5 In
addition, a plan would be permitted to take account in any equitable
fashion any increased cost from the expanded survivor protection.1 8 6
Because such increased cost could be borne by the participant, S. 209
would permit the participant to elect "out" from coverage.'8 7 In order
to discourage defined contribution plans from dropping optional annu-
ity forms of benefit because of IRS interpretations of the joint and sur-
vivor rules, S. 209 clarifies that a plan may provide that the normal
form of benefit is a form other than an annuity.18 8 The S. 209 joint and
survivor annuity proposal was approved by the Senate Labor and
Human Resources Committee on May 16, 1979.
III. CONCLUSIONS
As the American population grows older, the demand for retire-
ment income will increase. When the "baby boom" becomes the "se-
nior boom" in the next century, it is conceivable that the demand for
retirement benefits will become greater than the society's ability to pro-
vide such benefits. It is essential that comprehensive thinking and
planning be done now so that a "retirement crisis" does not confront
the nation early in the twenty-first century.
The proposals previously discussed are attempts to expand the role
private retirement plans play in providing retirement income. Through
harnessing the competitive energies of financial institutions interested
in marketing new "products," the special master plan concept could
become a key vehicle for expanding plan coverage. The adoption of
SMPs as well as other plans could be enhanced by permitting the five
percent declining tax credit for small employers, who generally are
least able to sponsor plans but whose sponsorship of plans is essential if
coverage is to be expanded. The simplified employee pension, which is
now law, should contribute to increased plan coverage, but only time
will tell whether this retirement savings vehicle will be popular with
employers and financial institutions.
184. S. 209 § 127 (adding new § 205(b) of ERISA).
185. Id § 127 (adding new § 205(c) of ERISA).
186. Id § 127(a)(7).
187. Id § 127(a)(5).
188. Id § 127(a)(1) (adding new § 205(a) of ERISA).
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With the increasing need for retirement income and limitations on
the amount employers can afford to contribute to plans, employees
should be encouraged to contribute toward their own retirement bene-
fits. A proposal to permit deductible employee contributions to retire-
ment plans or full contribution IRAs was passed by the Senate in 1978
and may yet be enacted into law. The likelihood of enacting proposals
permitting deductible employee contributions to limited IRA arrange-
ments, however, seems to be waning somewhat due to the complexities
associated with these concepts. The homemaker IRA, in contrast, is
relatively simple. Yet, Congress must deal with concerns about reve-
nue loss and disproportionate use by high-income taxpayers. Further
refinement is necessary with respect to the improved plan tax credit
proposal, and more political support is needed for expanded joint and
survivor annuity protection.
In addition to the foregoing proposals, more ideas must be gener-
ated to improve retirement plan coverage and benefits and to deal with
the entire retirement income question. Attention should be focused on
the appropriate limits on integration between Social Security and pri-
vate pension plans, and on the need and ability to pay for cost of living
adjustments to pension benefits. Assuming a modest five percent rate
of inflation, fixed private retirement benefits would be decreased by
fifty-four percent over fifteen years of retirement-the average fife ex-
pectancy of retirees.18 9 Attention should also be focused on the relative
roles of Social Security and private retirement plans in contributing to
capital formation. Studies indicate that Social Security has had a sub-
stantial negative impact on savings, while private plans appear to con-
tribute to increased aggregate saving and capital accumulation. 90 In
addition, an interesting area of inquiry is whether rapidly growing pri-
vate retirement plan assets should be used for "socially useful" pur-
poses. Should plan assets, for example, be used to provide mortgages
or housing for plan participants or others; or should such assets be used
to save the declining Northeast section of the country or to encourage
the growth of union jobs?
It is to be hoped that the President's Commission on Pension Pol-
icy 191 and the National Commission on Social Security1 92 will deal
with these and other important retirement income issues in a thorough
189. R. SclmIDT, supra note 5, at 25.
190. Munnell, Private Pensions and Savings: New Evidence, 84 J. POLITICAL ECON. 1031
(1976).
191. The President's Commission on Pension Policy was established by Executive Order 12071
on July 12, 1978, and held its first meeting on March 23, 1979. Hearings on S. 532 Before the
Subcomm on Civil Service and General Services of the Senate Governmental Affairs Comm, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) (statement of C. Peter McColough).
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manner. Retirement income policy is a matter of high national priority
that will only become more important as the "graying of America" con-
tinues. Through proposals such as those discussed above, and other
legislative, Presidential and private initiatives, action can be taken in
time to avoid a retirement income crisis.
192. The National Commission on Social Security was established by the Social Security
Amendments of 1977, 42 U.S.C. §§ 907a, 401, 1395, 1395dd (1977).
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